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The Cluster Account of Art: A Historical Dilemma
  Simon Fokt 
Abstract
The cluster account, one of the best attempts at art classification,
is guilty of ahistoricism.  While cluster theorists may be happy to
limit themselves to accounting for what art is now rather than
how the term was understood in the past, they cannot ignore the
fact that people seem to apply different clusters when judging art
from different times.  This paper shows that while allowing for this
kind of historical relativity may be necessary to save the account,
doing so could result in incorporating an essentially institutional
component or making the theory extremely complex and virtually
impossible to use.
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1. Introduction 
The modern quest for a definition of art largely focuses on
overcoming Moris Weitz’s anti-essentialist critique and exploring
sets of necessary and sufficient contextual rather than intrinsic
properties of artworks.  Berys Gaut’s cluster account distinguishes
itself from other classificatory attempts by not having a
conjunctive form typical of definitions.[1]  By giving his account a
disjunctive form, Gaut claims to preserve Weitz’s anti-essentialism
and even expand on his suggestion that what matters in
aesthetics are not definitions but  the criteria used to identify
art.[2]  However, despite its advantages, the cluster account is
guilty of a problematic form of ahistoricism.  The problems I raise
below culminate in a dilemma:  the account is either extremely
complicated and practically useless or it must include an essential
institutional element and is likely to be reduced to a form of
institutionalism.[3]
The cluster theorists hold the following:
The concept “artwork” is properly applied to an
object if this object is an artifact which has a certain
non-arbitrary subset of a set (cluster) of properties
commonly ascribed to art.
A cluster is a set of properties that are the criteria for the
application of a concept.  To be classified as art, an object must
satisfy at least one sufficient subset of criteria.  Gaut explains this
in three stages:  (1) a subset of fewer than all properties
belonging to the cluster and instantiated in an object can be
sufficient to apply the concept 'art' to that object; (2) none of the
properties is individually necessary for the concept to apply with
one exception, that all artworks need to be artifacts; and (3)
some of the properties are disjunctively necessary for the concept
to apply.[4]  Since sufficient subsets can be disjoint, two objects
can share no relevant properties and still fall under the same
concept.
A cluster includes properties commonly ascribed to art, that is,
the criteria for arthood.  There is no great theory behind selecting
the particular properties.  They are chosen prima facie as those
“properties the presence of which ordinary judgment counts
toward something’s being a work of art, and the absence of which
counts against its being art.”[5]  Finding out what the “ordinary
judgment’ is is a matter of inspecting how the concept is
commonly used in language.  Gaut argues that we should follow
Wittgenstein’s advice and look rather than think; that is, find the
criteria by examining the world and not the concept.  Thus, a
cluster includes such common sense candidates as “possessing
positive aesthetic properties,” “being an exercise of creative
imagination (being original),” “being an artifact or performance
which is the product of a high degree of skill,” and so on.[6]
The ten-element cluster presented by Gaut is defeasible; there is
no reason why new properties should not be added or why some
properties could not be removed or replaced.  The theory holds
that artwork is a cluster concept without determining what exactly
is included in the cluster.  Thus, changing some particular criteria
might have an influence on what objects the theory will pick out
as art but cannot challenge the structure of the theory itself.
The subsets of properties by virtue of which an object can fall
under the concept 'art' are not completely arbitrary.  In other
words, not just any subset of properties from the cluster will be
sufficient for the concept to apply; otherwise objects such as
philosophy papers, which can be formally complicated, original,
and intellectually challenging, would be art.  Thus to be art, an
object needs to satisfy not just any but at least one of the
sufficient subsets of criteria.
2. Computational difficulties
But how can one find out exactly which subsets are sufficient?  In
“The Cluster Account of Art Defended,” Gaut holds that it is
impossible to determine that, for example, any object that
satisfies the minimum of eight criteria is thereby art.  It is also
impossible to reliably weight the criteria and say that an object
has to satisfy whatever number of criteria provided their joint
weight is sufficient.  Instead, we should employ “the familiar
method of inspection:  that is, consider the particular subset, and
consider whether something satisfying it is [art] or not.”[7]
Such a method, however, is far from simple.  First, a softening-up
question will serve as a basis for the dilemma developed below. 
Exactly how much inspection does one need to do before one can
tell if “x” is art?  Since the ten properties offered by Gaut are not
set in stone, one would have to start with inspecting all
properties that potentially could be criteria for art, and then
decide whether they actually are.  But, since no regular method
for inspection is offered, the enterprise becomes extremely
tiresome.  One would need to inspect every possible property an
object may have, including both “is beautiful” and “has been
made on a Thursday” or “is located more than 231 meters away
from Jupiter.”  While this might sound quite ridiculous, it would be
necessary considering that we are given no guidelines for limiting
the domain of properties to inspect. 
Still, such reductio seems really unjust; surely one has an
intuitive idea as to where to look for art-relevant criteria!  I agree
that common intuitions can, in this case, be a certain guide, but
am skeptical as to whether they are enough.  Even if one decides
that intuitions are trustworthy, which I think is far from obvious,
they do not seem to be stringent enough a limitation.  Intuitions
might suggest where one is likely to find criteria, but it seems
implausible that they could entirely rule out the chance of finding
them elsewhere.  In other words, if one constructed a set of
criteria from only the intuitive candidate properties, one’s cluster
would only include the right kind of properties but not necessarily
all of them.  Virtually any definition of anything may invite similar
expansion, but this is particularly problematic for the explicitly
open-ended cluster and can greatly magnify the problems
described below.
One could think such a possibly incomplete cluster to be good
enough.  However, this is only the first step of the inspection. 
After a set of all criteria has been established, one has to
determine all sufficient subsets of the set.  Assuming that Gaut’s
set is complete, that is, there are only ten criteria, this requires
one to inspect exactly 210 possible combinations of those
properties or 1,024 possibilities, each of which should be
inspected threefold as a clearly sufficient, clearly insufficient, or a
borderline subset.  Every new criterion doubles the number. 
While it is certainly possible to do all this, and the cluster theorist
may be unperturbed by such minor computational difficulties, it
seems awkward that a theory that claims great heuristic utility
requires so much work.  At this stage, this might be a mere
softening-up objection, one that exposes the limitations of the
theory rather than seriously challenging it, but it will soon develop
into something much more serious.
3. Clusters and history
To overcome those limitations, Gaut could hold that the
“inspection” could be understood not as the typical philosophical
inquiry into intuitions but as actual empirical research, for
example, finding out which properties people actually do treat as
criteria and which subsets actually are treated as sufficient.  Then
there would be no need to inspect an infinite number of properties
or every combination from the set; one could just collect those
which are commonly thought of as criteria or sufficient subsets.  I
sympathize with this solution, but think that it merely points at a
much more serious problem, that such research would more than
likely show that people’s judgments are history-dependent and,
following that, so is the cluster.
To say that the cluster is history-dependent is to say that such
things as how many and which properties should be included in
the cluster, how those properties are weighted relative to one
another, and which subsets of properties are sufficient for arthood
can change depending on the historical context in which they are
considered.  In other words, determining the arthood of objects in
different historical contexts calls for time-indexed properties or
time-indexed clusters.  Following this, there is no such thing as
the cluster or the criteria for arthood.  Moreover, showing that
clusters are history-relative comes dangerously close to showing
that what actually matters in determining the arthood of objects is
not what criteria they satisfy, but what people think are the
criteria they should satisfy, at various times, in order to be art. 
However, this would lead one towards accepting a form of
institutionalism.
A cluster theorist might claim that such criticism is completely
misdirected.  Most modern definitions of art try to determine what
‘art’ means now, rather than what it meant historically.  The
cluster account is no different, so it appears that no historical
arguments can threaten it.  But there are two understandings of
‘historical,’ and at least one of these can present a true
challenge.  On the one hand, one can ask whether the
composition and relative weighting of criteria in the cluster does
not change historically, for example, that the cluster that we
accept now is different from the cluster accepted in the sixteenth
century.  Gaut can probably discard any objections based on such
understanding and simply admit that the theory was designed to
account for our current use only.  On the other hand, one can ask
whether, judging art now, we apply different clusters to art from
different times?  Do we not treat medieval art differently from
classical art and still differently from modern art?  We quite
obviously do; in fact, art historians explicitly advise us that we
should, and teach us how to adjust our approach to match the
kind of art we look at.[8]  This second understanding of historicity
is what I will discuss in the rest of this paper.
The case is best presented through specific examples.  When we
determine the status of medieval religious art, we ascribe a
different importance to creativity, originality, or imagination
(Gaut’s criterion (vii)) than when we deal with modern art.  For a
modern artwork to be ascribed the property “imaginative” or
“creative,” it needs to be radically different from other works,
whereas some medieval works can differ from their contemporary
art in mere details, yet still be treated as original.  This is hardly
surprising given the highly functional nature of arts before the
eighteenth century, and the fact that the church and the nobility
who commissioned the majority of artworks were interested in
preserving the status quo.  In fact, being imaginative was seen as
a vice in an artist, and “thinkers as varied as Hobbes, Descartes,
and Pascal declared it liable to fanaticism, madness, or
illusion.”[9]  While it would be wrong to assume that such views
were universally held, neither were they uncommon.  In such a
context, it seems natural that we should treat even rather
moderate amounts of creativity with higher esteem than we would
in the case of romantic art, where being creative was most
actively encouraged.
 
Figure 1: Duccio, Maestà, 1308-1311, Tempera and gold on wood, Museo
dell’Opera Metropolitana del Duomo, Siena.  Wikimedia Commons.
Yet, if we do, then either the meaning of the word ‘creative’ is
different when applied to these two types of art, which would
mean that Gaut’s criterion (vii) is in fact at least two separate
criteria, perhaps “is an exercise in creative-as-for-the-fourteenth-
century imagination” and “is an exercise in creative-as-for-the-
twenty-first-century imagination,” or that the amount of creativity
required is relative to types of art considered, which are
themselves relative to the historical and cultural contexts in which
they were created.  Either way, the composition or the weighting
of the elements of the cluster is time-relative.  Similar arguments
could be run for other criteria, such as we require more aesthetic
qualities from pre-avant garde art than modern art, more
expressiveness from romantic than classical art, more
individuality from post-romantic than pre-Romantic art, and so
on.
One could object that it is not the case that imaginativeness in
the above example is weighted differently; medieval art is treated
as art simply by virtue of satisfying different subsets of criteria
from modern art, even though it isn’t particularly original.  This
might be so in some cases, but not all.  Art historians often
describe medieval artworks as extremely creative, even though
their actual innovation is rather minor by modern standards.  For
example, Duccio’s Maestà is thought of as revolutionary in
changing the iconography of the Virgin from the Byzantine style
to a more “worldly,” approachable image,[10] but surely using
the already well-known three-dimensional perspective and
removing some gold from Mary’s robe cannot objectively compare
with the avant garde standards of re-inventing art completely
with every single work.  Yet, it is common and indeed seems
natural to think that it is this creative treatment of the traditional
iconographic model that partially makes works like Maestà
artworks; that is, it
Figure 2: Kazimir Malevich, Black square, 1915, Oil on Canvas, State
Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow.  Wikimedia Commons.
might be, at least in some cases, a non-disposable element of
many sufficient subsets of criteria.  But this would also suggest
that ‘creative,’ applied to modern context, means something
different, something more demanding.  Thus, what changes in
time is how much innovation must be introduced in a piece for it
to be called original.[11]  Additionally, if one were to take one
artwork and change the historical context in which one considers
it, it is likely that the weight given to the criteria would change. 
Consider Malevich’s Black Square.  As an avant garde piece, it is
an artwork partially in virtue of its creativeness.  Other criteria
might include “being intended as art” and “being in the genre of
painting.”  However, if an identical object were created in the
seventeenth century, it is unlikely that we would call it an
artwork.  This is at least partially because in cases of Baroque art
we do not normally require creativity as much as expressiveness,
successful representation, and a high degree of skill.  What this
example shows is that either the originality criterion has a greater
importance when applied to art created in modern times, where
“showing a high degree of skill” is seen as less important in works
created now than before the avant garde; or the cluster we use to
account for modern objects includes the criterion “original-as-for-
twentieth-century,” while the one used for Baroque art includes
“original-as-for-seventeenth-century”; or the subset of criteria
satisfied by Black Square is sufficient in the cluster used for
modern art but is insufficient in the one used for Baroque.
4. The dilemma
A cluster theorist can choose one of two possibilities now:  either
time-index the properties in the cluster or index the clusters.  For
the first option, the cluster of criteria includes no universal
properties, such as “being expressive of emotion” or “being an
exercise of creative imagination,” but only context-indexed
properties, such as “being expressive-for-pre-Romantic-art,”
“being creative-for-fourteenth-century-European-art,” and so on. 
The alternative is to index not the properties but the clusters.  For
example,  we treat Black Square according to the sufficient
subsets of properties from a cluster Modernism, and Maestà
according to cluster Medieval.  While the properties in those
clusters might be the same, different combinations of those
properties form sufficient subsets; perhaps the same properties
are weighted differently in different clusters. A dilemma follows: 
either there is one cluster that includes properties with all
possible relevant context-indexes, or there are as many clusters
as there are relevant contexts.
On the first horn of this dilemma, the theory becomes impossible
to use.  To determine which objects are artworks, one needs to
first know which subsets of criteria are sufficient, and the method
of finding out leads through inspection.  Above, I was trying to
show that this can be a rather tiresome venture, even if the
cluster only included ten criteria proposed by Gaut.  Assuming
that one filtered out all actual criteria from the infinite unrelated
properties an artwork-to-be might have, there are 1,024
candidate-sufficient subsets to check.  Were one to add only
another ten properties indexed to art from Maestà’s times, the
number would increase to 1,048,576, over a million combinations
to check by “looking and seeing.”  Following the roughest Western
art-historical divisions and distinguishing only prehistoric, ancient,
Medieval, Renaissance, Mannerist, Baroque, Classicist, Romantic,
Modernist and Contemporary art brings the number to an
astronomical 1.2676506 × 1030.  To actually tell whether an
object is an artwork, technically a cluster theorist needs to first
inspect an insane million trillion trillion potential sufficient subsets
of criteria.  And why should we forget about non-Western art? 
There are hundreds of major world-art contexts that should be
also considered; including them would raise the number to near
infinity.
Some might be tempted to say that this is merely a technical,
computational difficulty that does not undermine the validity of
the account, especially considering that Gaut is only interested in
defending its structure rather than its content or the particular
criteria involved.  However, and particularly in this case, the
typical philosophical disdain for any practical difficulties in actually
using the knowledge formulated in theory is rather out of place. 
Although it is not uncommon for theories to be rather complex in
practice, the cluster account might be incomparably more
complicated than any other theory.  Moreover, Gaut specifically
holds that he is, and all theorists should be, “trying to model a
real human capacity (to apply the word ‘art’), and that requires a
finite list, if the list comprises variegated criteria.”[12]  Yet, as the
above shows, even if the list is not infinite, it is definitely beyond
“human capacity” to deal with.  What is more, Gaut’s account has
multiple connections to very practical matters and treats those
connections as virtues of the theory:  the fact that criteria are
found by looking and seeing; the stress placed on having to
explain the concept in a way that will allow for the evolution of
the phenomenon it captures; the need to update the content of
the concept with changing practices; and so on.  And, regardless
of the particularities of the cluster account, I truly hope that even
the most condescending theoreticians would agree that when the
number of actions required to make a theory work passes a
million mark, the issue becomes more than that of mere
computational complexity.
On the second horn of the dilemma, no such problems arise.  It is
fairly clear that in judging Renaissance art, we test artworks
against the sufficient subsets from cluster Renaissance.  Clearly,
in this cluster different subsets of criteria count as sufficient from
those in cluster Modernism.  But accepting such differences must
force one to ask for their origin.  What are the variations in the
sufficient subsets of criteria relative to?  Surely indexing a cluster
to a certain time period does not mean indexing it to some
abstract date-shaped numbers but to the societies, cultures, and
beliefs of this period.  Thus a clear answer is that clusters are
relative to historical and cultural contexts, and it makes perfect
explanatory sense.  Surely the fact that the criterion of creativity
plays a much smaller role when applied to pre-eighteenth century
art is directly related to the historical fact that most art was
sponsored by the conservative church and nobility.[13]  A great
deal of what art historians after Riegl teach the audiences is
precisely to recognize these sorts of facts and treat works from
different periods differently.  Thus, while Gaut actively denies that
'art' is a concept of a social practice, explaining the differences in
the composition of elements in the clusters, and possibly relative-
weighting them, requires reference to the social practice by which
they are determined.[14]
Doing this, however, must lead to the rejection of the cluster
account in its present form.  While it might be true that we
determine the art-status of objects by testing their properties
against sets of criteria provided by the cluster, those sets of
criteria are relative to our social practices or, more to the point,
to the artworlds.  In fact, the question that should be immediately
asked after agreeing that certain artistic rules are determined
conventionally is,  “By whom?”  The simplest answer must be, 
“By the members of an artworld.”  But this would mean that the
artworld, and the social practices, beliefs, and institutions of art,
are what actually does a great deal of explanatory work in the
cluster account.   It may be that determining the art status of
particular works requires testing them against a cluster of criteria,
but finding the right cluster would first require consulting the
artworld.  In practice, the cluster account might find itself
degraded to the role of an auxiliary theory that fills in the details
of some form of institutional view.[15]
To sum up, the cluster theorists face a dilemma.  Agreeing that
art has a history and art of different times is treated differently
means that the cluster account is either so complicated that it is
useless or must include an essential institutional element.  Even
those who insist on treating practical uselessness as a mere
technical detail rather than a fatal flaw must agree that some of
the account’s professed aims may now be beyond reach.  It is no
longer modeling a real human capacity to apply the word ‘art,’ it
can no longer serve as a theory of art identification, and it may
lose a great deal of its heuristic utility.  Choosing the second horn
might prove much more fruitful, providing some links with the
actual treatment of art from various periods and our historical
knowledge of the artworlds of those periods.  But, although I
believe that developing the cluster account in this direction is the
right thing to do, it means changing the account into a part of a
larger, essentially institutional theory.[16]
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